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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This chapter examines the future of Japan’s hedged dependence on U.S. extended deterrence and 
encourages more imaginative thinking about potential outcomes and strategic implications as the    
“second nuclear age” unfolds.  
Main Argument: 
 With the U.S. nuclear umbrella shrinking and nuclear threats in Asia becoming greater and more 
complex, analysts cannot dismiss a nuclear-armed Japan as a purely academic exercise.  
 While we do not expect a Japanese nuclear breakout in the near term, Washington’s traditional 
reassurances—massive numbers of weapons deployed in theater and a robust regional presence—
have given way to a less convincing reliance on specific weapon systems amid a diminishing 
conventional military advantage.  
 Enhanced bilateral dialogue has been used to strengthen the alliance, but Japan’s neighborhood is 
more dangerous than ever, and the many domestic constraints on Japanese nuclear breakout—
cultural, political, and institutional—could become less restrictive than before.  
Policy Implications: 
 A U.S. decision to sustain extended deterrence will require significantly more resources and 
attention than heretofore assigned.  
 A more integrated, alliance-based approach to deterrence might therefore become attractive. 
 Alternatives to Japan’s long-practiced nuclear hedge may come to have appeal in Tokyo or 
Washington.  
 Coordinated regional action to limit North Korea’s nuclear development remains critical.  
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Japanese strategists have long been ambivalent about nuclear weapons. On the one hand, 
memories of horrific nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have sustained anti-nuclear 
sentiment and helped justify national policies championing nonproliferation and forgoing an 
indigenous nuclear arsenal. This “nuclear allergy” has been diagnosed as a genetic condition, and 
associated institutional and diplomatic constraints on nuclear breakout have been invoked to 
predict that Japan will find it virtually impossible to reverse course on nuclear weapons. 
Japan’s non-nuclear bona fides are well established. Until its revision in 2012, Article 2 of 
Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Law (1955) stated clearly that research, development, and 
utilization of atomic energy is limited to peaceful purposes.
1
 Japan joined the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and has generously supported the agency’s work. After 
considerable debate and delay—and the receipt from the United States of much greater latitude 
for nuclear fuel handling and reprocessing—Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1976 and supported the treaty’s indefinite extension in 1995. Japan 
also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1997 and was the first to sign the 
IAEA’s Additional Protocol in 1998, allowing a stricter regimen for IAEA inspections of 
Japanese nuclear facilities.  
Consequently, it was surprising to some in 2013 when Japan declined to join 74 other 
nations and sign a statement in advance of the next NPT review stating that nuclear weapons are 
inhumane and should not be used under any circumstance.
2
 This illuminates the other, more 
realistic side of Japan’s approach to nuclear weapons. The Japanese government does indeed 
believe that some circumstances might warrant the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, and 
the fact that Japan’s ability to act on this belief rests solely in U.S. hands is unnerving for certain 
politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo.  
Amid periodic reviews of the nuclear option in Japan, national policy has consistently 
depended on the “full range” of U.S. military might to deter nuclear attacks. This policy has been 
accompanied by frequent reminders to nuclear-armed rivals, as well as to Washington, that 
preemptive strikes and the use of nuclear weapons can be valid forms of self-defense. Japan has 
                                                 
1
 The 2012 amendment to the law adds “national security” as one of several reasons why nuclear safety should be 
guaranteed. Although the government and individual lawmakers claim this addition does not conflict with the 
“peaceful use” of nuclear energy, the revised law is arguably less clear on this point. See, for example, “‘National 
Security’ Amendment to Nuclear Law Raises Fears of Military Use,” Asahi Shimbun, June 21, 2012. 
2
 Japan Times, April 26, 2013.  
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made it clear since the 1950s that it reserves the right (and will maintain the capacity) to develop 
a nuclear arsenal of its own. This strategy—“lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear 
rollback”—is the essence of “the most salient example of nuclear hedging” among global 
powers.
3
 One Japanese analyst has framed Japan’s position on nuclear weapons as a balancing 
act between nuclear approval and nuclear denial.
4
  
Over the past four decades, Japan has maintained viable—and unconcealed—options for 
the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons and has justified its decision not to pursue 
nuclear breakout in many ways. But each time the regional security environment has shifted—
such as after China’s first nuclear test in 1964, the end of the Cold War, North Korea’s nuclear 
breakout in the 2000s, or the 2010 U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
agreement limiting warheads and launchers—Tokyo has re-examined its policy before signaling 
for (and accepting) U.S. reassurance on extended deterrence.  
Early on, U.S. reassurances were a straightforward matter. In the 1960s, U.S. nuclear 
weapons were dispersed widely around the world. In addition to thousands of nuclear-tipped 
missiles back home and patrolling the seas, the United States kept nearly 3,000 nuclear weapons 
“on shore” in the Asia-Pacific, including some 1,200 in Okinawa, where U.S. strategic bombers 
were based.
5
 This nuclear deterrent cost Japan relatively little: hosting U.S. military bases and 
providing for its own basic defense. The combination of Japan’s unwillingness to contribute fully 
to its own defense or to the defense of its U.S. ally and Japanese expressions of concern about 
the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella accentuated Japan’s cheap ride on national security.6  
                                                 
3
 Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27, no. 3 (2002/03): 
59–88 introduces and develops this concept (these quotes are from pages 59 and 71). Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan 
Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 2 (2007): 306 calls it “pragmatic pacifism” and argues 
that “it made sense [for Japan] to retain at least a latent capability to exercise the nuclear option” (these quotes are 
from page 311). Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic 
Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,” International Security 31, no. 4 (2007): 67–96 rejects the term 
“nuclear hedging,” but acknowledges that “the door to independent nuclearization [by Japan] remains ajar” (p.69) 
and that “formal barriers to nuclearization are surmountable” (p.91). 
4
 Yuri Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report,” 
Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 2 (2001): 55. 
5
 Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, “Where They Were,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (1999): 
30. Okinawa was under U.S. administrative control at the time. 
6
 On U.S. concerns about a Japanese nuclear breakout in the 1960s, see Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History 
and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). For an analysis of Japan’s cheap 
ride, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007). On the connection between extended deterrence and the “irony” of the 
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Reassuring Japan is more challenging today, however, and how Tokyo sorts through its 
strategic choices is more pertinent than ever. Japan faces new nuclear threats and relative shifts 
in the regional balance of power. Although more accurate and more potent, the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal is now smaller and less visible, and the “second nuclear age” is ushering in a multipolar 
and less predictable nuclear landscape.
7
 The United States withdrew the last of its land-based 
nuclear weapons from Asia in 1991 and reduced its overall nuclear stockpile by about 75% since 
then, and further reductions are being considered.
8
 More recently, U.S. reassurance has focused 
on the capability and flexibility of specific systems, but this has been undercut by Washington’s 
retirement of some that were earlier touted as being mission-critical.
9
 Bilateral dialogue and 
closer policy coordination have become more important aspects of reassurance and deterrence 
for the alliance, but the degree to which this can mitigate rising Japanese concerns about North 
Korea and China is uncertain.  
Japanese public opinion remains staunchly anti-nuclear, and Japan would likely be the last 
country in Northeast Asia to opt for nuclear arms. But while there are many domestic and 
international constraints on nuclear breakout, there are also signs of a more sophisticated debate 
in Japan about these issues as the demand for reassurance has escalated. The key questions are 
how Japan perceives its options, whether and how its calculus could change, and what this would 
mean for the region and the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
To address these questions, this chapter examines the origins and current state of Japan’s 
nuclear hedge and considers how deterrence and reassurance dynamics are evolving in the 
region. It then explores the prospects and implications for a nuclear breakout by Japan, as well as 
alternative strategic paths that Japan and the alliance can take. Although Japan’s nuclear hedging 
strategy is likely to continue in the near future, U.S. policymakers (and those throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                             
imbalanced commitments to the alliance, see Barry R. Posen, U.S. Grand Strategy: The Case for Restraint 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).   
7
 Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). 
8
  “Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 
3, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_fact_sheet_us_nuclear_transparency__final_w_date.pdf; and 
Scott Wilson, “Obama, in Berlin, Calls for U.S., Russia to Cut Nuclear Warheads,” Washington Post, June 19, 
2013. 
9
 For example, the retirement of nuclear-tipped Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles (TLAM/N) was announced in 
2010. Wade Huntley, “Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero: Nuclear Reductions and Extended Deterrence in 
East Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review 20, No. 2 (Summer 2013).11–12.  
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region) should not be sanguine about this strategy continuing indefinitely. Japan’s choices will 
be determined ultimately by how well potential threats can be managed and by the strength of the 
U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.  
Japan’s Current Posture 
The evolution of Japan’s nuclear posture owes as much to political circumstances as to a 
realistic assessment of U.S. capabilities and commitment. Japanese leaders have understood that 
pursuit of nuclear weapons is politically, diplomatically, and economically impracticable, but 
they also recognize that an independent nuclear deterrent is unnecessary as long as U.S. 
guarantees remain credible to potential adversaries. As a result, Japan decided early on to deny 
itself nuclear weapons and instead hedge against changing circumstances.  
Japan’s nuclear hedge has two elements. The first involves confirming (and serially 
reconfirming) the U.S. commitment and capability to use nuclear weapons in defense of Japan. 
In 1965, for example, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato asked Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to 
pledge to deploy nuclear weapons against China in the event of war. McNamara and President 
Lyndon Johnson gave that assurance. Similar conversations have followed at various levels of 
government and the military, always backed by reassuring public statements from Washington. 
In addition, for decades the Japanese government turned a blind eye to the possible introduction 
of U.S. ship- and aircraft-based nuclear weapons during port and base visits in Japan, despite its 
public pledge to forbid such practices.
10
 Beginning in 1976, each of Japan’s National Defense 
Program Outlines has stated that Japan will depend on U.S. extended deterrence.  
The second element involves Japan’s maintenance of the foundation for its own nuclear 
weapons program, should the country ever make that choice. Former prime minister Nobusuke 
Kishi believed that nuclear weapons were absolutely necessary if Japan were to have influence in 
world affairs, and he instructed his Cabinet Legislation Bureau in 1957 to formally pronounce 
that Japan’s constitution allowed the country to possess nuclear weapons for self-defense.11 An 
original member of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission recalled how “we were pressured 
                                                 
10
 New York Times, March 9, 2010 and Norris, Arkin, and Burr, “Where They Were,” 31.  
11
 Samuels, Securing Japan, 176. Kishi and then foreign minister Hisanori Yamada reportedly told MacArthur in 
1958 that their government was exploring the nuclear weapons option. See Kyodo News, March 17, 2013.  
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repeatedly to do basic research on how to make an atomic bomb.”12 Leading politicians have 
reasserted the constitutionality of nuclear weapons throughout the years, including current and 
former prime ministers Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso.
13
 In addition, an important policy study by 
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) noted in 1969 that “regardless of joining the NPT 
or not, we will keep the economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, 
while seeing to it that Japan will not be interfered with in this regard.”14  
Toward this latter end, and despite considerable opposition from within Japan and from the 
international community, Japan has never wavered from its early commitment to completing the 
nuclear fuel cycle. This commitment entails the maintenance of vigorous enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities, the stockpiling of separated plutonium, and the development of a fast 
breeder reactor (FBR) that other nations—most prominently the United States—have long since 
abandoned as too costly and dangerous. In fact, Japan has the largest nuclear-power program of 
any non-weapons state and is the only one with full-spectrum fuel cycle capabilities.
15
 Of course, 
Japan’s nuclear-power industry suffered a major blow after the 2011 tsunami-induced meltdowns 
at plants in Fukushima, and there are many legal, political, and technical restrictions that would 
make a Japanese nuclear breakout extremely difficult. Nonetheless, it has always been important 
for Japan to keep that option open.  
Opening the Nuclear Umbrella 
                                                 
12
 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a 
Japanese Bomb,” International Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 167. 
13
 Abe made his comment in a speech at Waseda University in May 2002 when he was deputy chief cabinet 
secretary, and Aso made the comment in November 2006 when he was foreign minister. The first Abe 
administration officially clarified this stance in a 2006 statement before the Diet, saying that “even with nuclear 
weapons, we’ve understood that possessing them would not necessarily violate the constitution as long as it is 
kept within [the limits of minimum capabilities necessary for self-defense].” See, for example, “Japan Can Hold 
Nuclear Arms for Self-Defense: Govt.,” Reuters, November 14, 2006. 
14
 Mainichi Daily News, August 2, 1994 and Taka Daitoku, “The Kishi Doctrine and the Construction of a Virtual 
Nuclear State in Postwar Japan” (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, 
New Orleans, January 5, 2013). 
15
 Nobumasa Akiyama and Kenta Horio, “Can Japan Remain Committed to Nonproliferation?” Washington 
Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2013): 152. For more on the domestic disputes about Japan’s “nuclear back end,” see 
Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
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Nestling under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” was never uncontroversial. Left-wing 
politicians argued in the mid-1960s that this policy was part of Washington’s plan for global 
domination, and much of the public feared becoming entangled in a nuclear war between 
superpowers.
16
 Some on the political right, seeing reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons as a symbol 
of Japan’s second-tier status, worried about national prestige and pushed for a more overt 
hedge.
17
 Conservative political leaders—including Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda in the 
pragmatic wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and revisionists such as Ichiro Hatoyama 
and Yasuhiro Nakasone—repeatedly called in private for an indigenous nuclear capability.18  
Inside the bureaucracy, opinions were mixed. MOFA warned in 1959 that Japan should not 
rule out the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, lest the country lose flexibility in 
pursuing national security.
19
 Later, in 1966, a vice-minister of foreign affairs stated publicly that 
Japan was not protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. MOFA immediately issued a “unified 
viewpoint,” introducing one of many awkward locutions the Japanese government uses to 
describe its national security strategy: it was not accurate to say that Japan was not covered by 
the nuclear umbrella.
20
  
Sato, initially a supporter of Japanese nuclear armament, reversed course when confronted 
with Washington’s strong nonproliferation policy and his own government’s internal studies 
concluding that reliance on extended deterrence was the best way forward.
21
 None of the 
                                                 
16
 [Nikkan Jōyaku nado Tokubetsu Iinkai: Nipponkoku to Dai Kan Minkoku to no aida no Kihon Kankei ni Kansuru 
Jōyaku nado no Teiketsu ni tsuite Shōnin wo Motomeru no Ken][Proceedings of the Special Committee 
Considering the Proposed Japan-Korea Treaty], House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan, December 3, 
1965. 
17
 Daitoku, “Kishi Doctrine,” 2. 
18
 See Ayako Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Policy,” Journal of American-
East Asian Relations 15, Nos. 1-2 (Spring-Winter, 2008):28–29; and Daitoku, “Kishi Doctrine,” 3. 
19
 Kyodo News, December 22, 2008.  
20
 Nobumasa Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture,” in Benjamin Self and Jeffrey 
Thompson, eds. Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics and Policy in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: 
The Henry L. Stimson Center), 86. For similar rhetorical gymnastics on defense policy, see Samuels, Securing 
Japan. 
21
 Some suggest that it is also possible that rather than seriously advocating for nuclear weapons, Sato was instead 
taking that position in order to extract security guarantees from Washington. See Kusunoki, “Sato Cabinet,” 31; 
and Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear 
Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed.: 357. Others are less certain. See Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi 
Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their 
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conceivable alternatives—i.e., domestic nuclear weapons production, nuclear sharing with the 
United States, or overtly denying U.S. nuclear protection—was considered viable at that time by 
most Japanese strategists. Understanding this, and provided with high-level U.S. assurances, in 
1967 Sato announced three non-nuclear principles of non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-
introduction. A year later he articulated the “four pillars” policy, and in 1970 the government 
signed the NPT, leaving no doubt about Japan’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.22  
One of the four pillars is the three non-nuclear principles, and this pillar is accompanied by 
three more: (1) promoting nuclear power for peaceful purposes, (2) promoting global nuclear 
disarmament, and (3) relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for protection from the international 
nuclear threat. The four pillars policy officially opened the nuclear umbrella, and even if it is 
perceived as leaky by some, this umbrella has remained open ever since. Although he privately 
called the three principles “nonsense,” Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974.  
Japan’s “Basic Defense” Rationale and Its Latent Nuclear Deterrent  
Around this time in the early 1970s, Japanese defense officials moved away from 
ambitious plans for a robust Self-Defense Force and adjusted to the political and economic 
realities of the time. A bellwether document penned in 1971 by Takuya Kubo, the director of the 
Defense Bureau of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), outlined a new direction toward basic 
defense. Kubo saw “no probable threats” to Japan and rationalized a small defense establishment 
and close alliance with the United States.
23
 Kubo agreed with other leading strategic thinkers that 
nuclear weapons had limited military utility for Japan. The country was too dense and too small 
and would always lose more than it gained in a nuclear exchange. Moreover, adversaries were 
unlikely to believe that Japan would actually use its nuclear weapons—a lack of credibility that, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nuclear Choices, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004), 218–53; and Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the 
Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 73. 
22
 For more on the Sato turnaround, the three principles, and the four pillars, see Green and Furukawa, “Japan: New 
Nuclear Realism;” Kusunoki, “Sato Cabinet;” and Solingen, Nuclear Logics.  
23
 Kubo’s memo was titled “A Framework to Consider the Arrangement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities,” World 
and Japan database, University of Tokyo Institute of Oriental Culture, February 20, 1971, http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.O1J.html.   
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according to Kubo, undermined their deterrent effect. “There is no choice but to rely on U.S. 
extended deterrence,” he concluded.24  
Japan’s basic defense concept became the centerpiece of the country’s first National 
Defense Program Outline in 1976 and continued to shape Japan’s defense strategy until it was 
superseded in 2010 by a “dynamic defense” concept.25 Although for Kubo nuclear breakout was 
off the table, his memo clearly articulated Japan’s nuclear hedge, positioning the hedge more as a 
signal to Japan’s U.S. ally than to its adversaries: “[Japan should] establish a structure to develop 
considerable nuclear armament capability at any time… [so] the United States will get worried 
about unstable international relations due to nuclear proliferation and will desire to maintain the 
U.S.-Japan security regime including extended deterrence.”26  
The most prominent and credible element of Japan’s latent weapons capability is its 
sophisticated nuclear-energy program and, in particular, its decades-long national commitment to 
completing the nuclear fuel cycle in the name of energy independence. This goal justifies 
reprocessing spent fuel and accumulating separated plutonium for use in a “pluthermal” mixed-
oxide (MOX) product. Extracting more energy from spent fuel by reusing it and operating FBRs 
that produce more fissile material than they consume can release Japan from its dependence on 
imported fuels. In theory, this energy strategy sounds sensible. The problem, however, is that the 
economics and engineering behind this MOX/FBR strategy are not working, and the plutonium 
continues to accumulate.
27
 Japan’s stocks of plutonium now vastly outweigh the amount needed 
for any plausible nuclear power or nuclear weapons program. One leading American expert 
suggests that today there is “enough plutonium in Japan to make 1,000 nuclear weapons.”28  
                                                 
24
 Kubo, “A Framework to Consider the Arrangement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities.”  
25
 See “Summary of National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond,” Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 3, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/decisions/2010/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/01/27/summary_ndpg_e.pdf. 
26
 Kubo, “A Framework to Consider the Arrangement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities.” 
27
 See “The Current Situation of Plutonium Management in Japan,” Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, 
September 20, 2011, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2011/siryo36/110920e.pdf. At the end of 
2011, Japan had 44.3 metric tons of separated reactor-grade plutonium. Of this, 9.3 metric tons are in Japan. The 
remaining 35 metric tons are in reprocessing plants in France (La Hague) and the United Kingdom (Sellafield). 
See “Communication Received from Japan Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium,” 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), October 3, 2012, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2012/infcirc549a1-15.pdf. 
28
 Frank von Hippel, “Should the U.S. Encourage South Korea and Japan to Make Plutonium-Based Nuclear Fuels?” 
(presentation at a Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2013). Ichiro Ozawa, a 
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Japan’s nuclear hedge requires that the connection between nuclear power and nuclear 
arms not be hidden. When the Japanese nuclear-power industry faced elimination after the March 
2011 catastrophe in northeastern Japan, senior leaders—including Satoshi Morimoto, the 
incumbent defense minister in 2012—argued that nuclear power was the basis for a “latent 
deterrent” and must be preserved. Likewise, former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba said that it 
was “important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a 
nuclear warhead in a short amount of time.”29  
A second element of Japan’s nuclear hedge is the expertise in potential weapon-delivery 
platforms that the country has gained through its space program.
30
 Although its primary space-
launch vehicle, the H-II series is poorly suited as a missile—given its liquid-fuel composition—
Japan has consistently pursued solid-fuel rocket technology, starting with the Kappa in 1956 and 
eventually leading to the 1.8-ton payload M-V in 1989.
31
 The decision to discontinue the M-V in 
2006 over cost concerns was opposed by some members of the Diet who believed the 
government should maintain such technology for its potential military utility.
32
 The M-V’s 
successor, the Epsilon-1, flew its first test in 2013 [check date later, should be in August].  
Although Japanese rockets are not designed to re-enter the atmosphere or hit a specific 
target, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency has been experimenting with re-entry 
technology since at least 1994 and accomplished its first controlled re-entry for the upper stage 
                                                                                                                                                             
senior Japanese politician, has suggested that the number of potential warheads is closer to three or four times von 
Hippel’s estimate. A decade ago, Jeffrey W. Thompson and Benjamin L. Self estimated that number to be in the 
hundreds in Japan’s Nuclear Option, 163. 
29
 Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change, 124. For their part, American officials rushed to support the beleaguered 
Japanese nuclear power program after the disasters of March 11, 2011. Some report that this was due to U.S. 
concerns about the effect of a shutdown on excessive plutonium stockpiles, but others suggest that U.S. 
dependence on Japanese nuclear technology requires a robust nuclear-power industry. Author’s interview with a 
former senior Japanese intelligence official, Tokyo, March 26, 2013. 
30
 For an optimistic assessment of the military capabilities of Japan’s space program, see Saadia M. Pekkanen and 
Paul Kallender-Umezu, In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010); and for an opposing view, see Thompson and Self, “Nuclear Energy.” 
31
 Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Making Sense of Japan’s Nuclear Policy: Arms Control, Extended Deterrence, and the 
Nuclear Option,” in Self and Thompson, Japan’s Nuclear Option, 114. 
32
 Author’s interview with a Japanese defense analyst, February 8, 2008.  
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of the H-IIB rocket in 2011.
33
 Japan has had access to U.S. ballistic missile–defense technologies 
at both the upper (mid-course) and lower (terminal phase) tiers, and has been developing space 
technologies to assist with precision targeting, including high-precision time control and orbital 
estimation.
34
  
Studies of Japan’s nuclear options do not agree on how quickly the country could establish 
a robust, survivable, independent nuclear deterrent—a much more challenging task than building 
a few bombs. Some conclude that Japan is technically capable of developing a nuclear weapon 
within a year (some studies even suggest six months or less), whereas others argue that it would 
take at least a decade.
35
 It is widely acknowledged that Japan lacks expertise on bomb and 
warhead design, reliable delivery vehicles, intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities 
designed to protect and hide assets from a potential first strike, a comprehensive command-and-
control system, and infrastructure to safely test weapons.
36
 These are not trivial constraints that 
could be overcome immediately. For example, if Japan wanted a sea-based deterrent—an 
attractive option given its greater survivability—it would have to develop ballistic-missile 
submarines and possibly nuclear-powered ones. Likewise, the use of reactor-grade plutonium, 
though not impossible (and not likely Japan’s first choice), would create new difficulties and 
take additional time.  
                                                 
33
 See “Successful Execution of Controlled Re-entry of Launch Vehicle Upper Stage,” JAXA Today, August 2012, 
22–23. 
34
 Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu, In Defense of Japan, 36–37; and Narushige Michishita, “Japan’s Response to 
Nuclear North Korea,” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 23 (2012): 99–112. 
35
 These comparisons are imperfect. Some refer to building a single bomb, others to building a robust, survivable 
arsenal.   For a range of estimates, see Federation of American Scientists , “Japan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,”, 
April 16, 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke; and Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or 
Coming Soon?” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2002–03): 63–75; Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holms, eds., 
Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2012); Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet”; and National Security Archive, 2005. The likelihood of 
further nuclear proliferation (National Intelligence Estimate No. 4-66). January 20. National Security Archive 
electronic briefing book no. 155, National intelligence estimates of the nuclear proliferation problem: The first ten 
years, 1957-1967. Posted June 1. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-12.pdf. A secret 
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There is, of course, an alternative and more likely route—using highly enriched uranium 
(HEU). The controversial Rokkasho nuclear enrichment plant has sophisticated centrifuges that 
provide Japan with a uranium-enrichment capability. Another, less likely, path to producing 
weapons-grade HEU could be a laser isotope-separation process, which Japan dabbled in for 
years before inefficiencies led to a cutback on implementation plans in 2001. Although laser 
enrichment is not commercially attractive, the know-how and equipment remain in Japan, and as 
we learned in the case of South Korea in 2004, experiments to produce HEU in small doses can 
be difficult for IAEA inspectors to detect.
37
 
There are other skills in which Japanese researchers excel that are often neglected in 
discussions of Japan’s latent deterrent. These include high-speed framing radiography, heavy-
metal shock physics, radiation hydrodynamics, and explosive shaping. Knowledge in these areas 
and others that are basic for development of a thermonuclear device is scattered throughout 
Japan’s industrial and research communities. It is not uncommon for Japanese research scientists 
to attend and present papers at international conferences on shock compression or high-speed 
photonics also attended by nuclear weapons scientists from the United States, Russia, and 
China.
38
 These research activities have practical application in a wide range of non-military areas 
and are not necessarily telltale signs of a secret nuclear weapons research program. Indeed, while 
some policymakers in Tokyo would like to foster closer ties between Japan’s scientists and 
defense planners, a wide gulf remains between the two communities.
39
 It also appears that Japan 
lacks deep experience with other activities relevant to a weapons program such as plutonium 
metallurgy or beryllium machining, which could be helpful depending on what path Japan chose.  
Still, Japan clearly has mature capabilities in certain areas, capabilities that are as relevant 
to its nuclear hedge as the country’s plutonium stockpile. It is also evident that national policy 
recognizes the value of these programs in preventing both the United States and potential 
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adversaries from taking Japan’s non-nuclear status for granted. In short, given Japan’s level of 
technological sophistication, stable civil-military relations, accessible and plentiful plutonium 
stockpiles, self-contained nuclear fuel cycle, and history of success in “spinning on” commercial 
technologies, the country’s nuclear hedge remains intact and credible.40  
Extended Deterrence 2.0 
The U.S.-Japan alliance and its extended deterrent have enabled the nonproliferation 
policies that help Tokyo signal its intention to refrain from breaking out with its own nuclear 
arsenal. Another vital factor has been the absence of a consistent existential threat to Japan. 
Whenever one or both of these factors seems to shift, signs of reconsideration in Tokyo become 
apparent and subtle reminders that Japan has other nuclear options are issued to Washington. 
Japan has long understood how important the nonproliferation objective is to the United States, 
and how to use it for policy leverage.
41
  
Primacy of Reassurance 
Japanese policymakers often remind their U.S. and regional counterparts (both privately 
and publicly) about the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Japan’s own ability to go 
nuclear if necessary. As we have noted, then prime minister Sato made such a statement in 1964 
and 1965, as did former prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa in 1998, opposition leader Ichiro 
Ozawa in Beijing in 2002, and foreign minister Aso after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test.42 
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Additional signals have been sent through Diet interpellations, as well as through unofficial 
channels and provocative political commentary.
43
  
Washington’s response to these signals has been consistent. In 2006, then U.S. secretary of 
state Condoleezza Rice visited Japan and reaffirmed the United States’ “will and capability” to 
meet the “full range of its deterrence and security commitments” in an attempt to reassure Japan 
that it is still well-protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
44
 President Obama offered similar 
public assurances after North Korea’s subsequent tests in 2009 and 2013 when Prime Minister 
Abe asked him to reconfirm the U.S. commitment to defend Japan with “an unshakeable nuclear 
umbrella.”45  
For now, reliance on U.S. extended deterrence persists even if discomfort with the status 
quo is growing. This discomfort stems from different sources. Some Japanese politicians and 
analysts are worried that a policy designed for a bipolar world order will become less reliable in 
a multipolar environment filled with regional nuclear powers. Japan could, in this formulation, 
become “detached” from U.S. strategic thinking.46 While some seek to prevent this through 
closer ties with Washington, others chafe under the postwar legal and diplomatic restraints that 
Japan agreed to live with for the sake of economic development; they would pursue a different 
postwar relationship with the United States by taking more security and diplomatic matters into 
their own hands.  
Yet the Japanese express concern about extended deterrence in contradictory ways. 
Whereas once they worried about the U.S. commitment when North Korean nuclear weapons 
could not reach the continental United States—i.e., that Washington might prioritize proliferation 
over the medium-range missile threat—now that the prospect of North Korea targeting the U.S. 
                                                 
43
 Although there were no mentions of “extended deterrence” in Diet hearings in 2008, there were 68 in 2009 and 58 
in 2010. See http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/ . There is also a long history of comments by “autonomists” outside 
government, such as Ikutaro Shimizu,  Nishihachi Hyodo, Tadae Takubo, and Terumasa Nakanishi, who have 
pressed Japan to break away from U.S. security guarantees and develop its own nuclear arsenal. See Kamiya, 
“Nuclear Japan,” 66–67; and Furukawa Katsuhisa, “Making Sense of Japan’s Nuclear Policy: Arms Control, 
Extended Deterrence, and the Nuclear Option,” in Self and Thompson, Japan’s Nuclear Option, 111. 
44
 “Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso after Their Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, October 18, 
2006.  
45
 Sankei Shimbun, February 22, 2013. 
46
 Yukio Satoh, “Agenda for Japan-U.S. Strategic Consultations” (article adapted from a presentation made at the 
International Symposium on Security Affairs, Tokyo, November 18, 2009). 
*DRAFT* 
15 
homeland has become more realistic, they express concerns because Pyongyang’s nukes could. 
For example, a Sankei Shimbun editorial suggested that Washington could be “intimidated,” 
quoting a former defense ministry official who opined that “we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility of Japan’s being cut off from U.S. nuclear strategy.”47  
In the case of China, the allies’ superiority in conventional forces appears more important 
than the nuclear balance for now, especially as the U.S. arsenal shrinks. This comes in part from 
a core challenge of extended deterrence, wherein a deterrence provider seeks to limit a conflict to 
the region it is protecting in order to avoid an all-out war that might entangle its homeland. 
Based on this logic, while Washington will do everything it can to prevent the escalation or 
expansion of an East Asian regional conflict, if the U.S. military cannot dominate 
conventionally, Washington might default to accommodation rather than resort to nuclear 
weapons. As one former diplomat explained, “the conventional superiority advantage is critical, 
because it obviates the whole debate about whether or not Washington would ‘sacrifice Los 
Angeles to save Tokyo’ in a nuclear exchange.”48 Consequently, even though nuclear weapons 
are a major psychological component of extended deterrence (and certainly the most talked 
about), Japan is also focused on the U.S. projection of conventional power, which is under strain 
from U.S. budget politics, Chinese military developments, and from Japan’s unwillingness to 
invest in its own defense.  
The United States’ budget problems, coupled with its efforts to reduce nuclear weapons 
globally, exacerbate a concern some have in Japan over the long-term durability of the U.S. 
nuclear infrastructure. By some measures, U.S. nuclear capabilities have atrophied over time. 
The United States has not developed a new warhead in over 25 years, and it has not tested a 
weapon since 1992. The U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy stated in 2008 that the United 
States “is now the only nuclear weapons state party to the NPT that does not have the ability to 
produce a new nuclear warhead.”49 The Obama administration is making some investments to 
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upgrade existing nuclear infrastructure, but Washington will soon face tough and expensive 
choices about what kind of nuclear deterrent the United States (and its allies) should have in the 
future.  
Some U.S. defense planners believe that when modern security problems are pushed to the 
higher rungs of a conflict-escalation ladder, the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Cold War will 
prove to be inappropriate for uses beyond deterring a large-scale nuclear attack against the 
United States or a close ally. As former deputy secretary of defense John Hamre observed, “the 
Cold War left us with a massive inventory of [nuclear] weapons we no longer need… [and] a 
shrinking community of nuclear experts hold on [to it] as a security blanket for a future they 
cannot define.”50 
Recent U.S. administrations have believed that deterrence through conventional weapons 
is decisively more credible than through any existing nuclear alternative. The challenge, 
however, is that continued U.S. investment in conventional military superiority is precisely what 
drives weaker states to pursue asymmetric solutions with nuclear weapons (e.g., North Korea and 
Iran) and prompts other major powers to keep pace with their own military investments (e.g., 
China), further worrying regional allies like Japan. There is no easy balance that truly guarantees 
security through strength without feeding into a broader security dilemma.  
Given the rising profile of these challenges since 2001, the United States and Japan began 
bilateral consultations in 2009 on strategic issues raised by the impending U.S. Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). For the first time, Japan moved onto 
the path of officially discussing and even influencing U.S. nuclear strategy and force planning, 
something to which the United States’ NATO partners had long become accustomed. Japan had 
been unsettled by prior NPRs that unilaterally shifted the U.S. force posture with little 
consultation.
51
 It was concerned that the United States might reach a decision to accommodate 
North Korea, move toward a “no first use” policy on nuclear arms, or retire nuclear weapons 
systems, particularly the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile (TLAM/N), without deploying 
compensating capabilities.
52
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During this time, Japanese officials reportedly gave American interlocutors a “non-paper” 
that described key criteria for sustaining extended deterrence. The paper highlighted reliability 
(i.e., confidence that warheads will function properly), flexibility (holding different targets at 
risk), responsiveness, discrimination (keeping low-yield options), and the ability to be either 
stealthy or visible, as warranted by the situation.
53
 While there was some doubt at the time about 
how high up this paper had been approved within the Japanese government, aspects of these 
criteria continue to be raised by Japanese officials, and the continuation of bilateral consultations 
on extended deterrence suggests that the allies have plenty to discuss.
54
 These criteria appear to 
reflect real concerns in Japan that require continued alliance attention. 
The success of the bilateral NPR consultations led both sides to want to continue talks, and 
in March 2011 they “regularized” the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD). The EDD is now a 
biannual event, with one of the meetings often involving a visit to a deterrence-infrastructure 
site. In 2013, for example, this included a tour of Naval Base Kitsap in Washington State to see 
the submarine leg of the nuclear triad and Trident missile facilities.
55
 These discussions are not 
trivial conversations or mere photo opportunities. They are a joint exploration by knowledgeable 
officials of current and emerging nuclear threats to the alliance, along with possible deterrence 
strategies.
56
  
The site visits are thorough and underscore the fact that U.S. declaratory statements are 
backed by demonstrable capabilities, with the human capital being among the most important. 
Site visits make the U.S. nuclear umbrella visible and tangible for Japanese officials, and they 
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highlight the significant investments that support it. Both countries’ principals hope that, over 
time, the EDD will also enhance deterrence by better integrating nuclear and conventional 
capabilities within the alliance for a tailored deterrence strategy, especially vis-à-vis North 
Korea. The EDD also provides Japan with an official channel to share its perceptions about 
extended deterrence with the United States, which makes the dialogue a useful bellwether for 
how the Japanese government feels about its nuclear hedge.  
The U.S. side reportedly is pleased that the EDD has deepened Japan’s understanding of 
extended deterrence and provided a better appreciation of the role played by conventional forces 
and missile defense, including high-end missile-tracking radar deployments in Japan.
57
 Still, the 
Japanese side appears to have an appetite for continued dialogue. Security planners in Tokyo 
acknowledge that discussions are “far deeper than before,” but some express concern that 
Washington will continue to surprise them.
58
 Reaffirmation of U.S. commitments and reliability 
alone is no longer sufficient. The EDD portends a more collaborative form of deterrence that 
encompasses the full spectrum of conventional and nuclear capabilities possessed by the allies. 
Japanese strategists who once expressed little more than “sheer and total dependence upon the 
American deterrent” now understand that assuaging their abandonment fear requires more 
Japanese involvement in lower (conventional) thresholds of potential conflict, and they seek 
greater input into Washington’s nuclear doctrine and priorities.  The EDD will have to balance 
this carefully.
59
 
External Threats 
While Washington has some control in addressing the reassurance factor, it faces limits 
when it comes to threats and threat perceptions. North Korea is a primary concern for Japan, 
largely because Pyongyang appears to care little about its people and invests heavily in nuclear 
and missile programs. North Korea’s nuclear capability could make the leadership even more 
reckless. Should the regime face imminent collapse or preemptive attack, it might judge that it 
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has little to lose (and could even forestall outside interference) by striking Japan with a nuclear 
weapon. There are also questions about whether or not Pyongyang can maintain effective 
command and control over these weapons.  
Washington’s official assessments of North Korea’s nuclear capability are written vaguely 
but express confidence that the North will be able to produce nuclear-tipped missiles in the not-
too-distant future and that their accuracy will improve.
60
 To strike Japan, North Korea could use 
some of its estimated two hundred Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles, which have a range 
of 1500 kilometers and a payload of one ton. North Korea is also developing a land-based 
intermediate-range missile (Musudan) that might be able to reach Okinawa and Guam. Although 
the accuracy of these missiles has been derided in the past, a battery of test launches in July 2006 
suggested that North Korea had improved their performance, and in December 2012 it put a 
satellite into orbit for the first time using a three-stage rocket.
61
  
A key problem for extended deterrence is the allies’ limited understanding of Pyongyang’s 
strategic calculus and Washington’s unexpressed preference to deal with North Korean nuclear 
threats by conventional methods. There could come a point where Japanese leaders feel that they 
need more control over the means of response. A 1995 JDA report made this point while 
otherwise dismissing the value of a nuclear option for Japan: “North Korean nuclearization…is 
not an issue that cannot be a condition for discussing the possibility of Japan going nuclear in the 
future.”62 In other words, the JDA identified North Korea as a threat that could cause Japan to go 
nuclear. 
Compared to North Korea, China’s nuclear arsenal and conventional capabilities are much 
larger and weigh heavily on the minds of Japanese defense planners. The main worry is not 
simply that China’s defense budget has almost tripled since 2001 to become the world’s second 
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largest.
63
 Rather, it is the nature of China’s military modernization and the relatively quick and 
substantial investments in capabilities that are aimed at the allies’ ability to dominate the skies 
and seas around East Asia. This strategic force modernization raises the potential costs that U.S. 
policymakers would need to weigh when considering the option of intervening against Chinese 
interests on behalf of Japan or Taiwan.  
 Another long-term problem is that China keeps building new nuclear warheads (up to ten 
in 2012). Although official Chinese policy states that China will not use nuclear weapons first—
or ever against a non–nuclear weapon state—its intimidation tactics in the maritime and cyber 
domains have worried some in Japan that these tactics could someday spread to the nuclear 
realm.
64
 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), after all, manages one of the world’s most active 
ballistic-missile programs. Many of its tactical weapons have enhanced ranges, accuracies, and 
payloads, and some put Okinawa within range when forward-deployed. Upgrades to Chinese 
missile warheads—including multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles—are enhancing 
Beijing’s deterrent and strategic-strike capabilities vis-à-vis Japanese and U.S. missile 
defenses.
65
 These slow-moving upgrades to the quality and quantity of Chinese nuclear weapons 
have some in Tokyo wondering whether Beijing will eventually seek nuclear parity with the 
United States, something that would require considerable time and investment, since the U.S. 
arsenal is significantly larger. 
Japanese strategists have to ask how much vulnerability the United States is willing to 
tolerate amid China’s strategic modernization and what it is prepared to do on Japan’s behalf, if 
anything, in response to China’s moves.66 Some prominent Japanese analysts suggest that a 
national nuclear deterrent, even if it were insufficient to deter a force as big as China’s in all 
circumstances, could complicate strategic calculations in Beijing to the extent that China would 
think twice before threatening to use (or actually using) its own nuclear forces in a regional crisis 
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or conflict.
67
 In short, Japan faces its own threats and has its own interests. As Campbell and 
Sunohara suggest, “the persistence of a Japanese-American alliance so robust that it can 
indefinitely persuade Japanese leaders from acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be guaranteed.”68 
Prospects and Implications for a Nuclear Weapons Breakout by Japan 
At the moment, the likelihood that Japan would build its own nuclear weapons is low. 
Constraints are multiple and significant. But they are not fixed, and it is worthwhile to examine 
the conditions, both internal and external, under which these constraints could loosen and Japan 
might change course.  
Internal Factors 
Public opinion. The “nuclear allergy” metaphor was coined in part to describe the Japanese 
public’s aversion to visits by U.S. Navy vessels that might be carrying nuclear weapons.69 
Japanese perceptions were colored not only by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
1945 but also by other incidents, such as in 1954 when a U.S. nuclear test at Bikini Atoll 
exposed 23 Japanese fishermen to high levels of radiation, eventually killing one and inspiring 
the Godzilla film series that sensationalized the potential danger and unpredictable nature of 
nuclear weapons.
70
 
It was against this backdrop that then prime minister Sato announced the three non-nuclear 
principles, a policy that maintains strong public support. As the Cold War wound down, polls 
showed that more than 75% of Japanese respondents still agreed with the three principles, and 
similar polls in 2006 and 2013 produced the same result. A 1998 Gallup Poll found that only 
16% of the nation was afraid of being attacked by another country using nuclear weapons and 
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89% felt no need for Japan to have nuclear weapons.
71
 Being a non–nuclear weapons state had, it 
seemed, become part of Japanese national identity.
72
  
The rise of China and the belligerency of North Korea, however, have raised awareness 
about the U.S. nuclear umbrella: only about 20% thought the umbrella was “necessary” in 1995, 
but almost half thought so in 2010.
73
 Still, even when candidates for the national Diet were 
polled on the issue of Japan developing its own nuclear weapons after two North Korean nuclear 
tests, more than half did not think such an option should ever be considered; only a third favored 
keeping this option open for the future, depending on the international situation.
74
  
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident hardened popular opinion against all things nuclear 
in Japan and led the government to shut down Japan’s nuclear-power infrastructure.75 Yet despite 
public opinion and a more independent regulatory system, the current Abe administration and 
private industry are pushing to revive and sustain the nuclear sector. With little organized 
political opposition to the conservative, business-friendly LDP government, we have seen 
Japan’s nuclear industry begin to regain its footing. It is already aggressively pursuing 
development opportunities in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  
The return to power of the LDP in 2012 is a reminder that overwhelming majorities can 
vote against their polled preferences and that even democratic governments can act 
independently of public opinion. The connection of public opinion to policymaking is 
particularly tenuous with respect to national security. For example, there was considerable 
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opposition to the NPT from the media, business community, and public when Japan signed the 
treaty in 1970.
76
 As we have seen, the decision to forgo an independent nuclear arsenal was 
based on realist calculations amid U.S. pressure, not on polling data. Campbell and Sunohara’s 
conclusion is correct that “although public sentiment against nuclear weapons remains strong, its 
ability to fully inhibit the decisions of Japanese leaders should not be exaggerated.”77  
Institutional opposition. Japanese political leaders considering nuclear breakout will face 
other obstacles besides public opinion, including opposition from an expanding variety of 
political, bureaucratic, and economic actors. For decades, bureaucratic responsibility for nuclear 
strategy resided solely in the Cabinet, with support from MOFA. Over time, however, the JDA—
renamed the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 2007—assumed a greater policy role. Nuclear power 
research and development, which is critical for any potential dual use, was split between the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)—now the Ministry of Economy Trade and 
Industry (METI)—and the Science and Technology Agency, which is now part of the Ministry 
of Education. Each had its own preferences.
78
  
In the economic realm, there are those whose interests lie in preserving a purely 
commercial exploitation of nuclear power.
79
 Japan’s utilities, the wider business community, 
bureaucrats charged with promoting economic growth, and politicians with ties to these interests 
are all powerful actors who would likely oppose a nuclear weapons program. In the event of a 
nuclear breakout, Japan’s electric-power industry could be crippled by a loss of access to nuclear 
fuel and would possibly be required to return current fuel stocks, given that their purchase was 
predicated on peaceful use. Moreover, large manufactures such as Hitachi and Mitsubishi could 
be shut out of overseas nuclear-development projects, and there might be a wider economic 
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backlash against Japanese firms in key markets like China and South Korea, as their 
governments hype the fear of a remilitarized Japan.
80
 
Prefectural governors also have an important vote on what kinds of nuclear-related 
activities can occur within their jurisdiction. In addition, some influential nonprofit organizations 
dedicated to preserving Japan’s non-nuclear status gained strength following the Fukushima 
crisis.
81
 Proponents of changing the nuclear status quo in Japan would likely face numerous legal 
and bureaucratic hurdles, including the certainty of drawn-out legal challenges.  
Although there is no question that weaponization would be difficult in Japan’s contested 
political system, circumstances can change over time. Japan’s robust democratic politics and its 
determined leadership have repeatedly demonstrated that opposition and veto power are not the 
same. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was ratified in 1960 over violent protests and widespread 
opposition and now is widely embraced. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, which began as the 
National Police Reserve during the Korean War, became a robust and lethal military force 
despite Japan’s pacifist constitution and early public opposition. It has never been more widely 
embraced by the Japanese public than it is at present. 
The postwar history of the Japanese military is filled with examples of government 
restrictions applied, only to be loosened at a later date. This was the case with Japan’s acquisition 
of fighter jets (first denied, then allowed), as well as its acquisition of mid-air refueling 
capabilities, legislating an ability to deploy overseas, use of outer space for defense purposes, 
and now the possible development of a long-range strike capability.
82
 Moreover, while approval 
for a weapons-related program surely would be even harder to obtain from local officials than 
approval for nuclear-power reactors, it is worth noting that some prefectural governors, such as 
Issei Nishikawa from Fukui, support nuclear power as the leading employment vehicle in their 
prefectures.  And some governors, like Shintaro Ishihara of Tokyo, openly argued for acquiring 
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nuclear weapons.  Weaponization work could be done in prefectures with supportive leaders, 
even if they hosted no reactors. 
Finally, even if Japan’s plutonium stockpile in Europe is out of reach and much of the 
separated fuel is controlled by private firms worried about repercussions in international markets, 
more than enough is held domestically under the aegis of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
(JAEA), a governmental unit. The rest is held by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, which is 
nominally a private firm, but one that performs public functions under close government 
supervision. Even allowing that only two tons of Japan’s plutonium stocks is both owned by the 
state (through the JAEA) and present in Japan, and that this might be the only plutonium 
available for Japanese weapons, this amount alone would be enough to build a large nuclear 
arsenal of several hundred weapons. In short, it is not clear how much of a constraint contending 
interests, private ownership of weapons materiel, and the overseas location of much of Japan’s 
plutonium would actually place on Japan if it were to decide to move from being a latent to an 
open nuclear weapons state. The motivation is the critical factor, not the obstacles. 
Discount Factors 
There are four additional constraints that would require leaders to discount the costs of 
dramatic policy change: (1) the vulnerability of the Japanese population to a first strike, (2) the 
undermining of Japanese diplomacy, (3) regional instability, and (4) damage to bilateral relations 
with the United States.  
Japan’s central vulnerability is its lack of strategic depth. The argument here is 
straightforward and has often been repeated. The majority of the Japanese population is clustered 
in a small number of densely populated urban centers. Because a first strike against Tokyo, 
Osaka, and Nagoya would cripple Japan, nuclear weapons have little military utility.
83
 While 
superficially compelling, this argument is hardly dispositive. It did not prevent Great Britain or 
Israel, with their similar geo-demographic profiles and same primary ally, from developing 
nuclear arsenals. The Israeli case, in fact, impressed some Japanese with how vulnerability can 
be discounted in the face of an existential threat.
84
 Nor would we expect a strike on New York or 
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Los Angeles to be any less crippling to the U.S. national economy.  Moreover, Japan’s 
population density and vulnerability to a first strike—particularly when its arsenal is still 
limited—could provide a strong motivation to deploy an independent ability to wipe out North 
Korea’s nuclear arsenal preemptively.  
Second, there is the loss of benefits derived from Japan’s diplomatic posture as a non–
nuclear weapons state. Legal withdrawal from the NPT is technically very easy—it requires only 
a 90-day notice to the other parties to the treaty and the United Nations Security Council—but 
the costs associated with the repudiation of decades of Japanese diplomacy and the nullification 
of many of the bilateral agreements that undergird the Japanese nuclear-power program would 
require a steep discount by the country’s decision-makers. Still, many of these leaders are 
concerned that the nonproliferation regime has been eroding, and Japanese diplomacy is already 
less strident on this point. Additionally, whether one agrees with this logic or not, supporters of a 
Japanese indigenous nuclear program have long argued that Japan neutered itself diplomatically 
by opting out of the nuclear club and that, from a realist perspective, Japan would fortify its 
diplomacy over the long run by changing its stance. 
Third, a nuclear breakout would certainly trigger or accelerate a regional arms race—one 
that would require a considerably greater investment in defense than postwar Japan has 
heretofore accepted. If South Korea had not yet broken out, it surely would after a Japanese 
decision to do so. Koreans have long been suspicious of Japan’s nuclear hedging, and the Korean 
media and its “unnamed” government sources regularly feed the perception that Japan is just a 
“few screwdriver turns” from a functioning weapon.85 Even the former ambassador to Japan, 
Chul-hyun Kwon, explained on the record that “Japan didn’t declare having nuclear weapons but 
they made the raw materials, and they…are in fact getting rid of the obstacles one by one as the 
opportunity offers. In the long term, I guess they are preparing for a nuclear weapon.”86 A 
Japanese nuclear breakout would not surprise the ROK, but neither would it be met with 
sympathetic understanding. 
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China and Russia would likewise respond by repositioning and possibly strengthening their 
strategic forces, and China in particular would push to isolate Japan diplomatically. Additionally, 
North Korea could be convinced that its reckless behavior has been rewarded with new 
alignments in the region. It is understandable, then, that many in Japan see no military benefit to 
be gained from breakout; instead, they worry that a new, higher-cost round in the extant security 
dilemma would detract from Japanese national security.
87
 But if Japan acted in response to a 
breakout by South Korea or to significant provocation by other states, then, as Nobumasa 
Akiyama suggests, “nuclear proliferation in Asia…might lower the threshold even for Japan to 
violate international agreements and treaties.”88 
Fourth, the United States has worked ceaselessly since the 1960s to keep Japan from 
becoming a nuclear weapons state, arguing that extended deterrence is a nonproliferation tool. 
According to one confident former Japanese diplomat, “the United States would never allow 
Japanese nuclear weapons.”89 But what if the drawdown in U.S. budgets and Washington’s 
desire to balance China collide on the Japanese archipelago? What if they meet in the form of a 
reversal of U.S. policy toward Japanese nuclear armament, especially against a backdrop of an 
even more dangerous North Korea that threatens to draw the United States into a nuclear war? 
Given current U.S. budgetary trends, exhaustion from more than a decade of war, and the United 
States’ refusal to act alone during the Arab Spring, it is not far-fetched to imagine Washington 
determining that it can no longer provide regional, much less global, strategic public goods on its 
own. In other words, it is hardly inconceivable that economic need and existential threat could 
trump vulnerability in nuclear strategy and overcome political constraint.  
Durability of the U.S. Security Umbrella amid New Threats 
Despite shifting threat perceptions among Japanese policymakers, Tokyo’s level of 
confidence in U.S. security guarantees remains high due to the Obama administration’s emphasis 
on diplomatic and military investments in Asia, Washington’s bipartisan emphasis on the 
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importance of alliances, and robust U.S. support for Japan during the tsunami and nuclear 
disaster in 2011. In the medium term, however, Japanese strategists are closely watching the U.S. 
response to Sino-Japanese confrontation in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 
For many, this is a representative or test case of the United States’ capacity and determination to 
deter Chinese aggression.
90
 Moreover, an anticipated one-third drop in U.S. defense spending 
from 2010 to 2015 and congressional resistance to funding base realignment plans in the Asia-
Pacific raise doubts for some in Japan about U.S. staying power in the region over the long 
term.
91
 Thus, while there is no imminent loss of confidence, certain trends are unsettling to the 
leadership in Tokyo. 
One of these trends is the decline in the qualitative advantage that the allies have 
traditionally held over China’s armed forces. As one analyst opined, “if the U.S.-China military 
balance in East Asia reaches parity, then the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will be 
gravely shaken.” 92  On this view, Chinese and North Korean nuclear-force modernization 
programs will exacerbate the decoupling problem for Japan. But such modernization could also 
accelerate U.S. rethinking of a possible Japanese breakout. Although a decision by Japan to 
acquire nuclear weapons may not be in the United States’ current interest, Washington’s ability 
and willingness to prevent it would wane over time if China’s capabilities were to continue to 
expand and especially if North Korea’s status as a nuclear power were to become a normal part 
of the strategic environment in Asia. Under such conditions, Japan’s desire for nuclear weapons 
would appear more reasonable and harder to counter.
93
  
The United States is taking steps to reassure Japan and shore up deterrence through close 
consultation and efforts to update plans and capabilities. But if Washington decides to sustain 
extended deterrence, it will have a tougher time demonstrating consistency and endurance. In 
                                                 
90
 Author’s interviews with an LDP Diet representative, a retired ambassador, a former senior intelligence official, 
and an adviser to the prime minister’s office, Tokyo, March 26–27, 2013.  
91
 Clark A. Murdock, Kelley Sayler, and Ryan A. Crotty, “The Defense Budget’s Double Whammy: Drawing Down 
while Hollowing Out from Within,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 18, 2012, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/121018_Murdoch_DefenseBudget_Commentary.pdf. 
92
 Nakanishi Terumasa, “Nippon Kakubuso” no Giron wo Hajimeru Toki [The Start of Japan’s Nuclear Debates], in 
“Nippon Kakubuso” no Ronten – Kokka Sonritsu no Kiki wo Ikinuku Michi [Debates on “Japan’s Nuclear 
Armament”: How to Survive This Critical Moment in National Existence], ed. Nakanishi Terumasa (Tokyo: PHP, 
2006).  
93
 Author’s personal communication with Thomas Christensen, February 15, 2013. 
*DRAFT* 
29 
years past, the United States’ reassurance methods fluctuated, beginning with significant forward 
presence in the region (both conventional and nuclear) that paved the way for Japan’s low-cost 
strategy of basic defense. When the Cold War ended and U.S. reliance on Japan seemed more 
equivocal, symbols of the United States’ presence and commitment became important, such as 
the maintenance of force levels in the region above 100,000 personnel.
94
 When U.S. force levels 
eventually dropped, Washington emphasized underlying capabilities as the critical factor, and 
this was also true on the nuclear front—for example, touting the TLAM/N to compensate for 
lower numbers and then conventional strength and dual-capable aircraft when the TLAM/N was 
retired.
95
 If the allies’ conventional advantage over China declines, however, and U.S. defense 
planners decide that U.S.-based strategic bombers can address nuclear threats more efficiently 
than introducing dual-capable aircraft into the theater, then Washington’s “reassurance story” 
will no doubt need to change again. 
Alternative Strategic Paths 
To this point, our review of Japan’s nuclear weapons options has elided at least four 
alternative paths to more independent nuclear deterrence for Japan within the alliance 
framework. The first three involve sharing nuclear weapons that are not of indigenous design and 
over which Japan would have less than full control. The fourth involves significant enhancement 
of Japan’s conventional strike capabilities.  All of these options would require major changes to 
Japanese defense policy and possibly constitutional reinterpretation or revision. 
In the first of the three acquisition scenarios, Japan could opt to buy or lease U.S. weapons. 
Japanese analysts have raised the possibility of a lease deal with a sunset provision for up to two 
hundred nuclear warheads with cruise missiles. Under the agreement, the United States would 
retain control over the electronic maps loaded onto the warheads and a right of launch refusal.
96
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Although such an approach would still require Japan to cross many of the same legal and 
diplomatic hurdles that it would face in building its own deterrent, while adding new hurdles for 
the United States, it would be the quickest and cheapest way for Japan to acquire and maintain 
nuclear weapons and could be easily reversed if desired. For example, in the event of Korean 
unification and denuclearization, Japan could simply terminate the lease and return the weapons 
and infrastructure. Among the many complicating factors, it is hard to imagine the U.S. 
government providing active support to a Japanese nuclear weapons program if South Korea is 
emphatically opposed. Presumably, Seoul would have taken a nuclear step first (with some 
sympathetic understanding from Washington) and would grudgingly accept a Japanese nuclear 
lease.  
The second option could be modeled on the extant arrangement between the United States 
and the United Kingdom, whereby Britain leases U.S.-made Trident II missiles, co-develops 
aspects of the submarine platform, and manufactures its own nuclear warhead according to 
certain U.S. specifications, including the use of some U.S.-made non-nuclear components.
97
 This 
approach would be less reversible and more expensive than the “turn key” lease method 
described above, but it would allow Japan to scale up its nuclear program more quickly and 
somewhat more affordably compared to home-grown options. Either of these approaches, 
however, assumes a U.S. attitude toward the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
that is fundamentally different from its current stance, and would be feasible only in the context 
of a collapse of the global nonproliferation regime. Still, one can imagine how U.S. policymakers 
could view this kind of approach as preferable to a purely indigenous Japanese effort, not only 
because it would maintain alliance ties but also because it would provide for a coordinated 
means of rollback if future conditions permitted.  
A third alliance-based option could follow the NATO model of nuclear burden-sharing, by 
which U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed on allied territory under U.S. control until a crisis 
erupts. At that point, following U.S. authorization, responsibility for the delivery of the weapons 
devolves to the allied host state.
98
 Before then, the ally would participate in command and 
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control arrangements and its pilots would be trained in nuclear warfighting doctrine. Although 
such burden-sharing arrangements were more widespread during the Cold War, there remain 
approximately 150 B-61s deployed at bases controlled by the allied host nations Turkey, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany for delivery by their F-16s or Tornados. The legality of 
these arrangements, however, has long been disputed under Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT.
99
  
Each of these options goes beyond Japan possessing a few bombs but falls short of a fully 
independent and survivable Japanese nuclear force. All three would, of course, require relaxation 
of Japan’s three non-nuclear principles and the reintroduction of U.S. nuclear weapons to bases 
on the archipelago. Each would allow more rapid deployment than a purely indigenous deterrent, 
and each requires U.S. cooperation. Many Japanese analysts who write on nuclear issues, 
however, advocate greater autonomy. Nisohachi Hyodo, for example, has argued for a force of 
two submarines roaming separate seas with one missile each, while Kan Ito and Yasuhiro 
Nakasone recommend “small size” Japanese nuclear weapons.100 Mitsuo Takai argues, however, 
that a reliably survivable Japanese nuclear strategy to deal with China or North Korea would 
require a much larger force—up to six nuclear submarines with three hundred high-yield nuclear 
warheads—while Takayuki Nishi has suggested that even this might be too small a force to deal 
with a foe like China.
101
 Either way, this level of militarization would contradict the Japanese 
Constitution’s prohibition of “war potential,” as currently interpreted by the government, which 
makes a distinction based on scale of destructive power.
102
  Ultimately, Nishi’s consideration of 
nuclear strategy convinces him that the best approach for Japan remains nuclear abstention 
coupled with missile defenses, as long as the growth of China’s nuclear missile force levels off.  
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This raises the fourth alternative deterrence strategy, a much discussed non-nuclear one 
that would maintain Japan’s nuclear hedge but entail a considerable enhancement of its 
conventional offensive capabilities. As one defense planner has explained, there is much more 
Japan can do to augment its deterrent short of nuclear weapons breakout.
103
 Although Japan’s 
self-imposed ban on the acquisition of long-range strike capabilities has been thinned by 
successive reinterpretations of the constitution, the MOD budget has remained static, and the 
military has been slow to acquire the carriers, bombers, strike fighters, and ballistic or cruise 
missiles that would expand Japan’s capacity to punish adversaries at a distance.104 But some 
Japanese leaders are seriously considering the need to augment U.S. capabilities. One senior 
military officer invoked a common metaphor: “we have been at our parents’ knee [oya no sune ni 
kajiru], but U.S. shins have become thin.”105 He joins a chorus of defense planners who advocate 
changing the extant alliance model in which the United States is the “sword” and Japan is the 
“shield” to one in which both countries have offensive capabilities sufficient to deter regional 
aggression.
106
 As Narushige Michishita has reported, “the most widely debated” military option 
for Japan going forward is the acquisition of strike capabilities for preemptive counterforce 
operations against hostile bases.
107
  
This “strike capability” movement reached a climax during the drafting of the National 
Defense Program Guidelines in 2004, when the JDA sought funds to develop long-range, 
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surface-to-surface missile technology.
108
 But the LDP’s coalition partner, the New Komeito 
Party, vetoed that proposal and the plan was dropped. The Abe administration put this issue back 
on the table for consideration in 2013 after South Korea’s decision in 2012 to extend the range of 
its ballistic missile forces to eight hundred kilometers provided diplomatic cover. Such a shift 
could enhance Japan’s deterrence posture, whether or not it were integrated with U.S. military 
doctrine in ways that would make deterrence more effective and credible; however, it also risks 
complicating the regional security dilemma and engendering domestic political blowback. 
Washington has long pushed for a more militarily capable Japan but is reluctant to weigh in 
publicly on this sensitive issue, lest the United States be viewed as either encouraging or 
restraining Japan. On this latter point, in particular, the U.S. side is aware that efforts to dissuade 
Tokyo from adding strike capacity could be unsuccessful and might accelerate the loss of 
Japanese confidence in its ally, thereby prompting an even quicker development of independent 
capabilities.  
Conclusion 
Henry Kissinger has suggested that the logic of war shifted with the introduction of nuclear 
weapons in ways that are connected directly to issues examined in this chapter. He stated that 
before the nuclear age, “the consequences of abandoning an ally were deemed to be more risky 
than fulfilling one’s obligations. In the Nuclear Age, this rule no longer necessarily held true; 
abandoning an ally risked eventual disaster, but resorting to war at the side of an ally guaranteed 
immediate catastrophe.”109  It is of no little significance that this passage is well known among 
Japan’s strategic elites, many of whom point to the declining credibility of extended deterrence 
and the fact that nonproliferation norms have also withered. 
Campbell and Sunokawa, who insist that a Japanese nuclear breakout “would be 
potentially catastrophic,” have warned U.S. leaders and public commentators against raising 
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questions about extended deterrence or encouraging Japan to consider alternatives to its nuclear 
hedged status quo: “American leaders and influential commentators both within and outside the 
government should never signal to the Japanese, even inadvertently, that they actually favor 
Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.”110  But as we have seen, thoughtful Japanese security 
specialists have not needed encouragement to cast an unsentimental and realistic eye on the 
future of extended deterrence. They have needed no prompting to raise questions about Japan’s 
strategic defense and to interrogate U.S. overextension.  
Equally thoughtful international security specialists in the United States have begun asking 
similar questions. Michael J. Mazarr, a professor of national security strategy at the U.S. 
National War College, is concerned about U.S. “strategic insolvency”—the pursuit of 
“yesterday’s strategy under today’s constraints” and the United States’ growing inability to 
manage the gap between its strategic commitments and its national objectives.
111
 Barry Posen 
argues that 
extended deterrence is a very risky business, and the United States ought to have been glad to 
shed such commitments after the Cold War ended. Instead, the United States retains extended 
deterrence commitments in Europe and Asia…. Extended deterrence remains a plausible path 
to one or more nuclear weapons being used either against U.S. forces or the U.S. homeland.
112
 
Posen lays out four options for Japan beyond its alliance with the United States. Two are low-
probability courses of action: that Japan could find a new nuclear protector or that it could 
bandwagon with China or other rivals. Echoing some of the strategists explored in this chapter, 
Posen observes that a third option is for Japan to persist with its nuclear hedge, which he says is 
tantamount to “ignoring the problem” and which one Diet representative called “closing our eyes 
and whistling past the graveyard.”113 The fourth option, nuclear breakout, is the one that has been 
explored in this chapter in its several possible forms.  
Like Israel, which has climbed much higher up the nuclear weapons ladder, Japan has 
assumed what Vipin Narang labels a “catalytic posture,” one that “relies on an ambiguous 
nuclear capability aimed at ‘catalyzing’ third-party—often U.S.—military or diplomatic 
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assistance to defend the state by threatening to unsheathe its nuclear weapons.”114 To assume this 
posture, having assembled nuclear weapons is not even strictly necessary—one simply requires 
the “ability to assemble a handful of nuclear weapons.” Given the availability of a superpower 
patron and other constraints on more overt change, this posture may continue to serve Japanese 
security interests well and is Tokyo’s most likely choice should it opt to follow Israel. 
Manipulating the threat of breakout remains a mechanism to keep Washington in the game in 
East Asia. 
Still, as this chapter has shown, much remains uncertain in the changing East Asian 
security environment. North Korea, in particular, is an unpredictable actor and a growing threat 
to alter Tokyo’s calculus. At present, few voices in the Japanese or U.S. strategic communities 
openly advocate a Japanese nuclear breakout. But given questions about how the emergence of a 
multipolar nuclear Asia will complicate national and alliance strategies, the possibility cannot be 
dismissed. Both communities should be aware that extant constraints on such a dramatic shift 
can be stretched, that threat perceptions can change, and that a range of once unthinkable 
alternatives is available.  
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